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To: General Michael V. Hayden
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Langley, Virginia

RE: Response to Directorate of Operation's request for more information:

Latest information on Tajik plan to videotape and/or capture USAMA BIN LADEN while he is on his annual FALCONHUNT vacation in Iran.

Dear General Hayden,

I am the attorney for an internationally respected NGO which works for the preservation of falcons (The Union for the Conservation of Raptors). In 1994 this NGO made contact with Tajik tribesmen who have worked with the NGO since that time. The Tajik team claims to maintain a loose surveillance on Usama Bin Laden over the last three years. I have been in contact with Phillip C. Quest of the Operations Directorate who has requested more information to establish their bona fides. Information requested as follows:

1. One of the Tajiks (hereinafter T-2), alleges that he knows exactly when UBL will travel inside Iran for his upcoming seasonal vacation. According to T-2, the Iranian government always requires that UBL's "male relative" (possibly his son, Sa'ad Bin Laden) be placed under VIP house arrest for the duration of UBL's seasonal vacation. This is the tip to begin the Tajik's surveillance operation.
2. According to T-2, UBL travels inside Iran for at least 3-5 months each year during the six month falconry hunting season, which commences in the fall and ends during March. T-2 claims that his group visually observed UBL's "male relative" under house arrest as recently as last December 2006, and that UBL is due to return in the last quarter of 2007 for the start of the next hunting season, which he allegedly never misses. The US NGO that operates the Tajiks, confirms that UBL is addicted to falconry, and would likely attend the opening of the hunting season with the faithfulness and predictability of a baseball fan attending the opening game.
3. Using the house arrest tip, it may be possible to match UBL's arrival date with the seasonal migration patterns of the falcon's prey so as to obtain a rough

- approximation of UBL's whereabouts. As the migration patterns move from North to South along the eastern borders of Iran, it will be possible to anticipate his movements. We can predict his whereabouts with 50% reliability for any given month, 70% for a three month window and a 90% chance of identifying him during any particular six month hunting season. These odds are augmented by using radio telemetry and UAV monitoring as discussed infra.
4. UBL's vacation patterns are allegedly known to T-2 in detail because he claims to have gone hunting with UBL during November 2004 and spent several days getting friendly with him. T-2 dutifully reported the details of his encounter with UBL to T-1, who is the Tajik team leader and a long-time associate of the late Ahmed Shah Masoud. T-1 speaks reasonably good English, and controls T-2 and an armed militia of some two hundred Tajiks, who are able to cross from Turkmenistan into Iran almost at will because of their rat-lines and reliable local contacts who are beneficiaries of black market trade.
 5. There is some circumstantial evidence to support T-2's sighting. Ken Timmerman claims to have one entirely independent source with photographic evidence to corroborate that UBL was in fact visiting in Iran in November 2004, so that a meeting with T-2 at that time is plausible. T-2 says that in November 2004 he wandered into UBL's hunting camp by accident while operating a cross-border rat-line. He controls a network of safe-houses and compliant local officials across Iran, necessary for the smuggling of contraband. After being accepted by UBL, T-2 was treated as an honored guest, was fed and stayed with UBL hunting for several days.
 6. During that time, T-2 surreptitiously learned the transmitter frequencies used on the telemetry transmitters placed on each of UBL's three falcons. It is very likely, but not certain, that UBL uses the same three frequencies during each hunting season as that is the normal practice. The US NGO claims this is extremely significant. An expert, terrestrial falcon tracker can pinpoint UBL's unique cluster of frequencies from a distance of 10 miles in ground clutter, or from 100 miles away in line-of-sight. It can also be determined by an expert ground-based tracker, whether or not UBL's falcon is (1) flying aloft after game or alternatively (2) standing upright on UBL's glove "manqala" or standing upright on the ground while eating freshly killed prey.
 7. The original plan to capture UBL (which I have strongly advised against without CIA sanction) involves US nationals entering Iran on a private scientific expedition. The US NGO has in fact obtained entry visas and permission from GOI environmental agencies and the IRGC to enter Iran to conduct biological field research. The IRGC is providing armed security guards at all times, at the request of the US NGO. Their true reason for insisting on an armed IRGC escort is twofold: to certify to the GOI that the US NGO is not engaged in espionage, and to function as a potential source of weapons for the Tajik team, if and when contact with UBL is made and extraction is possible. The Tajik team, who pose

- as servants for the NGO, are actually extremely skilled bodyguards with significant combat experience. Moreover, UBL travels with a very small four person retinue on vacation, perhaps the only time he is so weakly protected.
8. The US NGO telemetry receivers have been surreptitiously equipped to identify UBL's falcon transmitter frequencies. The US NGO has official GOI permission to use their telemetry receivers for tracking Golden Eagles (permitting access to mountains) and Cranes (permitting access to the lowland steppe). Official permission has already been granted for the US NGO to operate in six Iranian territorial regions, in a variety of elevations that will enable 'low-intensity conflict' field operations, including radio telemetry surveillance.
 9. The US NGO alleges that, even without the radio frequencies, T-2 can predict with 70% accuracy that during the months of October, November and December UBL will be hunting within a particular hundred mile square kill box akin to a national park, near the Turkmenistan border which the Iranian government reserves for UBL's exclusive use each year at the opening of the hunting season. Both the timing of the hunting season and the dimensions of the kill box are influenced by the annual migration into Iran of an increasingly rare bird, the Houbara Bustard, which is considered by many Arabs to be an aphrodisiac. The Houbara Bustard is UBL's favorite hunting target.
 10. If you have no objection, I will arrange privately for an unmanned aerial surveillance vehicle to patrol above this park area at night, searching for campfires. T-2 says UBL travels in a white SUV with an escort of four men, including servant and driver. The UAV must search for a campfire with five men sleeping on a carpet with their heads next to the fire with one SUV nearby. Once T-2 knows precisely where UBL is within the 100 mile square, he can enter the camp and renew contact with UBL. Alternatively the US NGO can notify the appropriate CIA contact when they locate the radio frequency signals for UBL's falcons, and then pinpoint his location by triangulation of the radio signals.
 11. It is also possible that the US NGO can locate UBL's signals from inside Iran during their field research. Another option is to pick up UBL's radio telemetry signals from across the border in a neighboring country, with this plan conditional upon UBL hunting within a 100 mile range of the Iranian border. This will usually occur only at the very start of the hunting season. The latter tracking option provides the most safety to the US NGO as it does not involve cross border operations, and permits the pinpoint direction of a UAV below Iranian radar level.
 12. The Tajiks and the US NGO wish to use the videotape from the UAV as evidence to collect the \$25 million reward for positively identifying the whereabouts of UBL. However, if the night vision/starlight camera on the UAV is not clear enough for the CIA to identify UBL sufficient to justify payment of the reward money, the Tajiks will be forced to risk sending the UAV back into Iran during daylight hours to obtain a clear video/audio tape as proof, sufficient to obtain the

reward. There is, of course, a risk that a daylight flight will tip off UBL and/or the GOI that he is under surveillance.

13. T-2 and his team under the command of T-1 have the option of following the hunting party and taking UBL into custody. However, if the Tajiks take the risk of apprehending UBL themselves, they will expect an additional reward on top of the \$25 million for identifying his whereabouts. The falconry expertise of the US NGO will be used to lure UBL's hunting falcons (preferably across the border) so that UBL or his falconer will walk into the Tajik's trap.
14. It is the intention of the US NGO to videotape and/or facilitate the capture of UBL by the Tajiks. I have strongly advised them to cooperate with the CIA. However, T-1 and T-2 are both convinced that the US government does not want UBL captured or killed, or they would have done so many years ago. (To my surprise I am hearing this view as widely held within the intelligence community). The Tajiks envision the UAV as a sort of overhead witness, as a form of protection for the Tajiks against possible betrayal by another US agency or by an ally of the US government (such as the Saudis, who might be embarrassed by UBL's live capture and testimony at a future trial).
15. The Tajiks are especially concerned about a risk of the CIA 'rendering' their team, and suitable measures are required to ensure that T-1 and T-2 are treated honorably, with respect to their culture. Time is of the essence if you wish to have an operation in play for the start of the October 2007 hunting season. If this operation is sanctioned by the DO, then the CEO of the US NGO, T-1, and T-2 will make themselves available for polygraphs and will cooperate fully with agency personnel.
16. The CEO of the US NGO is favorably known to myself, Lt. Gen. Tom McInerney (USAF ret.) and Maj. Gen. Paul Valley, (AUS, ret.) The information should be graded B-2 (usually reliable source, information probably true).
17. If I have not heard back from your agency by August 01, 2007 we shall assume that you have no objection to our proceeding privately in the fall to videotape UBL for the reward and/or capture him alive. I believe, however, that it is in everyone's best interest that we work together.